COULD AND SHOULD AMERICA HAVE MADE AN OTTOMAN
REPUBLIC IN 1919?

PAUL D. CARRINGTON*
Generations of American school children have memorized the
words of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. Its evangelical
spirit was echoed in Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and scores of
other presidential addresses. Partly on that account, numerous
Americans, perhaps especially American lawyers, have since the
1780s presumed to tell other peoples how to govern themselves. In
2006, that persistent impulse was echoed once again in an address
to the American Bar Association by a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.1
The purpose of this Essay is to question the wisdom of this
evangelical ambition. Sometimes cited as examples of successful
political evangelism are the constitution of Japan and the Basic Law
of Germany.2 Both of those constitutions were for numerous reasons
congenial to the existing local cultures and traditions.3 The 2003
invasion of Iraq was in important respects a product of the notion
that orderly democratic government can be imposed almost
anywhere, an idea that seems to have had special appeal to the
* Professor of Law, Duke University. This Essay draws passages from my book,
SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD: STORIES OF ITS LAWYER-MISSIONARIES (2005). Kristin Seeger
has provided very valuable assistance in assembling it. Portions of this Essay were published
previously in Paul D. Carrington, Mandatory Constitutions, 1 BUCERIUS L.J. 31, 31-38 (2007),
and are reprinted herein with grateful acknowledgment.
1. For a video of Justice Kennedy’s keynote address to the ABA, see Justice Kennedy
Declares World Jury Still Out on Meaning of Freedom (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.abavideo
news.org/ABA374/media/kennedy/wmv.
2. See, e.g., JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: FULFILLING AMERICA’S DESTINY
94 (1991); James Dobbins, Nation-building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World’s Only
Superpower, RAND REV., Summer 2003, at 17.
3. For brief accounts and references, see Carrington, supra note *, available at
http://www.law-journal.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ PDF/ausgabe012007v3.pdf, and Paul D.
Carrington, Writing Other Peoples’ Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. (forthcoming 2008) (describing American engagement in the wrting of the Liberian, Hawaiian,
Filipino, Siamese, Japanese, and German constitutions).
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militant “neo-conservatives” who expressed their hopes and
expectations in the Statement of Principles of the Project for a New
American Century, an instrument that should be read and remembered with remorse for centuries to come.4
The missionary impulse to change the political cultures of other
peoples by force that is expressed in that Statement is often
misguided, hopeless, and even counterproductive. But just possibly
there are times and places when cultural change can be externally
imposed. One of the limits of our human condition is our preoccupation with recent experience that sometimes teaches the wrong
lesson. As a possible example, this Essay considers whether a
democratic regime could or should have been imposed on all or parts
of the former Ottoman Empire in 1919, after its collapse following
World War I.
I. THE IMPERIAL IMPULSE
Before addressing the question posed, one should note the
resemblance of legal evangelism to imperialism. Andrew Bacevich
has vigorously urged Americans of the “neo-con” persuasion5 to try
to see themselves as others do: as overbearing imperialists.6 He
followed Reinhold Niebuhr, who noticed long ago that Americans
“frantically avoid[] recogni[zing their own] imperialis[t] impulses.”7
This American tendency was prefigured by other imperialists who
long explained their military initiatives as a service to the peoples
they subjected to conquest. The Spanish explained their imperial
search for precious minerals as a dissemination of the Christian
faith,8 just as Moors had earlier justified their conquest of Spain as
necessary to inform the vanquished that Muhammed was a prophet

4. This statement was published on the internet in 1997. See Project for the New Am.
Century, Statement of Principles (June 3, 1997), http://www.newamericancentury.org/
statementofprinciples.htm [hereinafter Statement of Principles].
5. Forcefully expressed in id.
6. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S.
DIPLOMACY 242-44 (2002).
7. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, ON POLITICS 294 (Harry R. Davis & Robert C. Good eds., 1960).
8. The classic account of Spanish missionary zeal is WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, HISTORY OF
THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO AND HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF PERU 148-50, 636-38 (Modern
Library 1936) (1853).
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sent by God.9 Wise and learned Germans professed in 1914 the
belief that the German people were called to defend the humane
values of western civilization against the evil threat of Czarist
Russia and its craven French ally.10 Gladstone, that most eminent
Victorian, oblivious to the class-ridden nature of Victorian law,
explained the aims of the British Empire as equally benign:
We think that our country is a country blessed with laws and a
constitution that are eminently beneficial to mankind, and if so,
what [is] more ... desired than that we should have the means of
reproducing in different portions of the globe something as like
as may be to that country which we honor and revere?11

Earlier evangelical imperialists were also sometimes warned of
their failure to see themselves as others did. Long before Jefferson
wrote the Declaration, John Milton cautioned his fellow legislators
that they should not “[l]et ... England [] forget her precedence of
teaching nations how to live.”12 And in 1899, James Bradley Thayer,
then the most eminent scholar of American constitutional law,
would echo Milton:
[We Americans have] an opportunity to illustrate how nations
may be governed without wars and without waste, and how the
great mass of men’s earnings may be applied, not to the machinery of government, or the rewarding of office-holders, or the
wasteful activities and enginery of war, but to the comforts and
charities of life and to all nobler ends of human existence,—so,
I say, to our country ... that [the] solemn warning of Milton,
“God-gifted organ-voice of England,” might well have come [to
us]: “Let not America forget her precedence of teaching nations
how to live.”13

9. On traditional Islamic evangelism, see BETTY KELEN, MUHAMMAD: THE MESSENGER
OF GOD 240-48 (1975). See also MICHAEL BRETT & WERNER FORMAN, THE MOORS: ISLAM IN THE

WEST (1980). On the evangelical aggressiveness of the Ottomans, see LORD KINROSS, THE
OTTOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE 197-215 (1977).
10. See JÜRGEN VON UNGERN-STERNBERG & WOLFGANG VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, DER
AUFRUF “AN DIE KULTURWELT!” 162-64 (1996).
11. PAUL KNAPLUND, GLADSTONE AND BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL POLICY 202 (1966).
12. JOHN MILTON, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND, WITH THE ASSEMBLY (1645), available
at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~Milton/reading_room/ddd/parliament/text.shtml.
13. James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464, 466 (1899).
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The lesson Milton and Thayer sought to teach was substantially
learned by many Americans in the two decades that followed his
utterance. And the United States adhered to that teaching in 1919
when the future of the collapsed Ottoman Empire was open to
consideration. But might not a little cultural imperialism in 1919
have spared the United States and the people of the Middle East
from the grief being experienced in 2007? Maybe Milton and Thayer
are sometimes wrong.
II. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN 1919: A PROBLEM FOR AMERICA?
The great Ottoman Empire, it may be recalled, was the successor
to the great Byzantine Empire.14 Seljuk Turks had gained control of
the Greek imperial capital of Constantinople in 1453.15 That city,
earlier known as Byzantium, had been since 305 the seat of the
emperor Constantine and his successors who long ruled the more
stable eastern half of what had been the Roman Empire.16 The
Turks renamed it Istanbul as the capital of a Turkish empire that
they then extended to include the valleys of the Danube, Tigris, and
Nile Rivers and much of the shores of the Black and Mediterranean
Seas, reaching to the gates of Venice and Vienna and to the Straits
of Gibraltar.17 Thus, for about 1400 years, the city was the seat of
the wealthiest and most powerful nation on earth.18 However, by
1900 the Sultan’s dominion no longer extended across the Balkans
or Africa, but was limited to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean,
Mesopotamia, and the Arabian peninsula.19

14. The era of its great power is depicted by JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, BYZANTIUM: THE
EARLY CENTURIES 26 (1989). On the decline of the Byzantine Empire, see MICHAEL ANGOLD,
THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE 1025-1204, at 284-95 (1984).
15. NORWICH, supra note 14, at 26.
16. See id. at 34-35, 381-82.
17. KINROSS, supra note 9, at 116-22, 231-344.
18. See CAROLINE FINKEL, OSMAN’S DREAM: THE STORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 13001923, at 3 (2005).
19. See generally DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1700-1922 (2d ed. 2005)
(recording the decline of the Empire).
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A. American Relations with the Empire
The relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the United
States opened in the eighteenth century with the piracy practiced
on American ships by the forces of Ottoman satraps or beys ruling
Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli as subordinates to the Sultan in
Istanbul.20 The United States waged a successful naval war on those
pirate states in the first years of the nineteenth century.21
Thereafter, the Empire became the object of Americans’ religious
concern. With occasional exceptions, it had long been a place of religious and ethnic tolerance for almost every variation of Christian,
Judaic, and Muslim faiths, more tolerant indeed than contemporaneous European empires.22 Turks, Kurds, and Arabs were divided
among many diverse forms of the Islamic faith.23 In addition to
many adherents of the ancient Orthodox faith long centered in
Constantinople and along the Aegean coast, there were hundreds of
thousands of Armenian Christians spread through the realm.24 A
substantial community of Maronite Christians loosely associated
with French Catholicism, who answered to the Pope in Rome, was
centered in Lebanon.25 And there was a vestige population of
observant Jews in Palestine, the place to which all manner of
Christian pilgrims had been drawn since the fourth century.26
By 1818, American Protestants were increasingly ambitious to
bring the world to their faith.27 They would begin by correcting the
failures of the Crusades to recover the Holy Land for those of correct

20. See MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH, AND FANTASY: AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
1776 TO THE PRESENT 18-20 (2007).
21. See id. at 17-79.
22. Some Christian sects found the Sultans more tolerant than the governments of
Austria or Venice. See KINROSS, supra note 9, at 207-10.
23. On the demographic diversity of the Empire, see ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE
ARAB PEOPLES 59-97 (1991); on the story of the Kurds, see PEOPLE WITHOUT A COUNTRY: THE
KURDS AND KURDISTAN (Gerard Chaliand ed., Zed Press trans., Zed Press 1980) (1978).
24. On the Greek population, see JASON GOODWIN, LORDS OF THE HORIZONS: A HISTORY
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 275-82 (First Owl Books 2000) (1998); on the Armenians, see NICOLE
POPE & HUGH POPE, TURKEY UNVEILED: A HISTORY OF MODERN TURKEY 7-20 (paperback ed.
2004).
25. GOODWIN, supra note 24, at 95.
26. See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, BIBLE AND SWORD: ENGLAND AND PALESTINE FROM THE
BRONZE AGE TO BALFOUR 22-49 (Ballantine Books 1984) (1956).
27. OREN, supra note 20, at 80-83.
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beliefs.28 Missionaries went forth from the Old South Church in
Boston to take their faith to the Holy Land of Palestine. It was,
however, viewed by the Sultan as a capital offense to attempt to
convert a Muslim away from the Islamic faith.29 Since they were not
allowed to convert Muslims, they would start with the Jews,
Maronite Christian, Orthodox, and Armenian populations in the
region and bring all of them to the Protestant faiths. It was also
envisioned that Jews in other lands could be brought back to their
place of cultural origin and converted to Christianity.30
American religious missionaries were at first resisted by the
Sultan. This was changed by the revolution in Greece that ended in
1827 with the separation of that nation from the Empire.31 Many
Europeans and Americans had lent support to the Greek revolutionaries, but the United States Navy had, unlike those of England,
France, and Russia, stood aside lest its involvement undermine the
hope of the United States to isolate the world’s hemispheres that it
had expressed in the Monroe Doctrine.32 In 1830, the Sultan
rewarded American disengagement in the Greek Revolution with a
trade agreement.33
Meanwhile, the Sultan’s former state of Egypt occupied the
neighboring territories of Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.34 When the
Europeans forced the Egyptians to restore the Sultan to power in
that area, the Sultan promised greater freedom with regard to
religious practices. The result was a steady and sustained effort of
American Protestants to convert the population of the region to
their faith. The missionaries came from diverse sects. The first
Mormon missionaries, for example, arrived in 1844,35 decades before
they settled Utah. Congregationalist missions were established in
distant Mesopotamia and in Armenia.

28. Id. at 81.
29. Id. at 92; see also SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE
OF REASON 113 (2004) (citing BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND HOLY
TERROR 55 (2003)).
30. OREN, supra note 20, at 87-90.
31. Id. at 114-18.
32. Id. at 110-11.
33. Id. at 115-16.
34. Id. at 128-29.
35. Id. at 142.
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Very little success was achieved in converting either the Jewish
or Arab population of Palestine to any Protestant faith.36 More
progress was made in Lebanon and Syria, primarily among those of
other Christian faiths. Education became the primary means of
spreading the word. These efforts had the support of the United
States government to the extent of providing occasional protection
for missionaries by numerous consular officials spread about the
Empire, and on a few occasions by the United States Navy.
Not everyone was impressed with this missionary enterprise.
William Makepeace Thackeray encountered the American consul in
Jerusalem. Learning of the scheme to make Palestine and Syria an
independent state for Christianized Jews, he concluded that the
minister “has no knowledge” of the region “except what he derives
from prophecy.”37 But the minister was expressing a widely shared
idea that had been advanced in 184438 by George Bush, a biblical
scholar at New York University and an ancestor of two American
Presidents. Perhaps more apt was the comment attributed to an
Arab guide of that time: “You Americans think that you can do
everything .... But you cannot conquer Almighty God.”39
In the decades that followed, the Protestant missions in the Holy
Lands attracted, in addition to pilgrims, American tourists.40 Mark
Twain was among them. In 1869, he recorded his exploration of the
region, reporting among many other things the deeply moving
discovery in Jerusalem of the grave of his ancestor Adam.41
B. The Empire’s Collapse
In the nineteenth century, as their empire was driven out of
Europe, much of the Muslim population of the Balkans retreated
36. Id. at 122-24, 285-90.
37. Id. at 143.
38. GEORGE BUSH, THE VALLEY OF VISION, OR, THE DRY BONES OF ISRAEL REVIVED (1844).
39. OREN, supra note 20, at 128 (internal quotation omitted).
40. Id. at 149-73.
41. MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD, OR, THE NEW PILGRIMS’ PROGRESS 567 (1869)
(“The tomb of Adam! How touching it was, here in a land of strangers, far away from home,
and friends, and all who cared for me, thus to discover the grave of a blood relation. True, a
distant one, but still a relation. The unerring instinct of nature thrilled its recognition. The
fountain of my filial affection was stirred to its profoundest depths, and I gave way to
tumultuous emotion. I leaned upon a pillar and burst into tears.”).
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into the shrinking Ottoman territory and the Sultan began to
posture as a religious leader to Islam.42 In 1893 the disintegration
of the Empire was marked by the beginning of a genocidal conflict
between the Sultan’s Turkish subjects and their Armenian neighbors, an extermination that the Sultan could not or would not
control.43 There was, however, no persecution at that time of the one
hundred thousand or so Jews residing at peace among the Arab
population of Palestine or of the Roman Catholic minority in
Lebanon, for they were not threats to the Empire.
The Empire’s participation in the World War was an act of
desperation. Among the nation’s frailties was the questioning of the
loyalty of the Armenian population that had long provided an
important core to the social order resulting in the renewal in 1915
of the genocidal conflict of 1893.44 There was also rising tension
between the Turkish population of Asia Minor and their Christian
Orthodox neighbors of Greek ancestry, who were also suspected,
perhaps with cause, of disloyal sentiments resulting from their
religious ties to the enemy, Czarist Russia, and their identity with
neighboring and hostile Greece.45
In the course of the war, the British supported a successful revolt
against the Sultan by Arabs in the southern region of the Ottoman
Empire.46 That revolt had been led by Prince Feisal with the help of
the legendary British officer, Lawrence of Arabia.47 In 1916, the
British Army occupied the valleys of the eastern region of the
Empire that would in time become Iraq. Then in 1917 the British
Army invaded the center of the Ottoman territory, marching north
from Suez through Jerusalem to take Damascus.48
By the time of the assembly at Versailles, the Sultan no longer
governed even the streets outside his palace. Indeed, in 1919 there
42. KINROSS, supra note 9, at 549-53.
43. OREN, supra note 20, at 292-93. A full account is provided by GUENTER LEWY, THE
ARMENIAN MASSACRES IN OTTOMAN TURKEY: A DISPUTED GENOCIDE 15-27 (2005).
44. See, e.g., DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: CREATING THE MODERN MIDDLE
EAST 1914-1922, at 212-15 (1989); YUSOF HALAÇOĞLU, FACTS ON THE RELOCATION OF
ARMENIANS (1914-1918), at 44-57 (2002); JUSTIN MCCARTHY ET AL., THE ARMENIAN REBELLION
AT VAN 168-69, 180-86 (2006).
45. See SALÂHĐ R. SONYEL, MINORITIES AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
256-57 (1993).
46. HOURANI, supra note 23, at 315-22.
47. See ADRIAN GREAVES, LAWRENCE OF ARABIA: MIRAGE OF A DESERT WAR (2007).
48. HOURANI, supra note 23, at 315.
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was a brutal struggle between Turks and the Greek population
within the Empire, renewing the hostilities of a century earlier.49
With the encouragement of France and Great Britain, Greece
claimed the coastal provinces of Asia Minor. “Turkey is no more,”
Lloyd George exulted.50 But peace between Greece and Turkey
would be crafted at Lausanne in 1922 by forced removal of all
Muslims from Greece and all Orthodox Christians from Asia Minor,
ending a millennium of peaceful coexistence.51
C. International Zionism
An additional issue for those at Versailles was posed by the
Balfour Declaration. In 1916, Britain had proclaimed that it
“view[ed] with favour” the aspiration of Zionist Jews to establish a
homeland in Palestine.52 Palestine had been occupied by the British
Army in 1917. The Declaration had been made on the initiative of
Chaim Weizmann, the English leader of the Zionist movement that
had emerged among the Jewish population of Europe in the late
nineteenth century53 in response to the pogroms to which Jewish
subjects of the Czar were being subjected.54 The British government
in making the Declaration was at least partly motivated by the hope
of elevating the patriotism of British Jews who were, not without
reason, skeptical of the war being fought in the trenches of France,
and also perhaps of weakening the support given to the German and
Austrian governments by their large and generally patriotic Jewish
subjects.55
49. POPE & POPE, supra note 24, at 36-39; SONYEL, supra note 45, at 431-34, 540-47; ERIK
J. ZÜRCHER, TURKEY: A MODERN HISTORY 153-55 (new ed. 2004).
50. FROMKIN, supra note 44, at 431.
51. See BRUCE CLARK, TWICE A STRANGER: THE MASS EXPULSIONS THAT FORGED MODERN
GREECE AND TURKEY 87-101 (2006); ONUR YILDRIM, DIPLOMACY AND DISPLACEMENT:
RECONSIDERING THE TURCO-GREEK EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS, 1922-1934, at 2-3, 8-9, 87-91
(2006).
52. See LEONARD STEIN, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION app. at 664 (1961).
53. JEHUDA REINHARZ, CHAIM WEIZMANN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN 74-75 (1993).
54. BEN HALPERN & JEHUDA REINHARZ, ZIONISM AND THE CREATION OF A NEW SOCIETY 1118 (1998); DAVID VITAL, THE ORIGINS OF ZIONISM 51-55, 65 (1975); DAVID VITAL, A PEOPLE
APART: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN EUROPE 1789-1939, at 701-02 (1999). More than
a few English Protestants had envisioned such a return as the occasion for the return of
Christ and had long lent support to the Zionist idea. See TUCHMAN, supra note 26, at 121-46.
55. TOM SEGEV, ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE: JEWS AND ARABS UNDER THE BRITISH
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The Zionist movement had also gained footing in the United
States.56 It is to be distinguished from the longstanding movement
of Protestant Americans to restore the Jewish population of
Palestine as converted Christians.57 A leader of Zionism in the
United States was Louis Brandeis, a person of Jewish ancestry who
was not observant of any religious faith but who admired the Jewish
culture and sympathized with the victims of pogroms.58 He was
joined by his friend and follower, Felix Frankfurter.59
But many Jewish Americans of that time were not supportive of
the international movement. One such person, Henry Morgenthau,
served as American Ambassador to the Sultan from 1913 to 1917.60
He was a native of Germany brought to New York by his parents
and educated at City College and Columbia Law School. After a
career in New York real estate, he undertook an active role in the
Democratic Party and was appointed by President Wilson as
Ambassador to the Ottoman Sultan. He was not altogether pleased
with this appointment because he regarded himself as an assimilated American and he preferred to represent his country in a role
in which his religious beliefs were irrelevant.61 He was nevertheless
persuaded to perform the assigned role. Like many European Jews,
he feared that Zionism would evoke widespread mistrust of their
loyalty and diminish their opportunity to assimilate to the cultures
of the nations in which they were residing.62
Brandeis was, however, a formidable figure commanding great
personal respect from the President, and his support of Zionism was
itself enough reason for the President to make no adverse comment
MANDATE 53 (Haim Watzman trans. 2000). See generally STEIN, supra note 52.
56. On American reactions, see MELVIN I. UROFSKY, AMERICAN ZIONISM FROM HERZL TO
THE HOLOCAUST 213-20 (1975).
57. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
58. HALPERN & REINHARZ, supra note 54, at 177-78; PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS:
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 224-26 (1984).
59. On their relationship, see LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURTER: A DUAL
BIOGRAPHY 289-92, 338-41 (1984); ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE
PROMISED LAND 37-38 (1988).
60. See Roger W. Smith, Introduction to HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR
MORGENTHAU’S STORY xxv (Wayne State Univ. Press 2003) (1918). On his anti-Zionism, see
BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE ASSIMILATIONIST DILEMMA: AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU’S STORY, in
PRACTICING HISTORY 208, 216-17 (1981).
61. OREN, supra note 20, at 332-37.
62. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 60, at 285-86, 309.
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about a British Declaration viewing with favor an event unlikely to
happen. While anti-Semitism was abroad in the United States,
there was no anti-Zionism, save among some assimilationist Jewish
Americans.
American Zionism was to be distinguished from the international
movement led by Weizmann. Brandeis and his followers were
concerned to assimilate the Jewish immigrants with the Arab
residents of Palestine in a democratic society. Democracy was not a
primary concern of Weizmann, who envisioned a Palestine governed
by the world-wide organization representing all Jews everywhere
that he was then leading. That vision was not appreciated by the
majority Arab population of the region.
By the time of Versailles, the British were having second
thoughts about their relation to Palestine.63 Both Sir Arthur
Balfour, the Foreign Minister and author of the Declaration, and
Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson argued that the resources of the
British Empire were already spread far too thin.64 Although Arabs
and Jews in Palestine had gotten along well enough for many
centuries, the larger Arab population was displeased by the
Declaration.65 And the British military did not relish the task of
governing that agitated population.
D. A Suggestion at Versailles
Thus the Ottoman Empire was in a terminal condition as the
World War came to an end and the victors assembled at Versailles.66
Not only the Ottoman Empire, but those of the Czar, of Hapsburg
Austria, and of Hohenzollern Germany were in states of collapse.
The Empires of Britain and France were very nearly so.67 One item
on their agenda was: what to do with the collapsed domain of the
Sultan. Among the ideas on the table were that the United States
might assume responsibility for governing the territories of Armenia
63. SEGEV, supra note 55, at 118-19.
64. Id. at 147.
65. See generally EDWARD W. SAID, AFTER THE LAST SKY: PALESTINE LIVES (1985). For an
account of the turmoil, see FROMKIN, supra note 44, at 415-65.
66. For a full account, see A. L. MACFIE, THE END OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1908-1923
(1998).
67. On the stupidity of the war, see BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST (1962).
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and Palestine, at least until such time as the peoples of those areas
were suited to self-government. Prime Minister Lloyd George, an
ardent imperialist and not himself in favor of the idea, tentatively
asked if the United States might be willing to step in and take
responsibility for bringing peace and order to the Holy Land.68
Colonel Edward House, Wilson’s unofficial advisor, advised the
Prime Minister that the United States was unsuited to imperial
responsibilities such as he suggested.69 But there were in 1919 other
Americans at Versailles who were concerned about the future of the
Ottoman territories and eager to address the issues. One was
Ambassador Morgenthau. He had in 1915 found himself heavily
involved in the issue of Armenia. He was distressed beyond measure
over the reports he received from American observers of the
slaughter, over the indifference of the Sultan’s government as much
as by its inability to prevent it, and over the unwillingness of the
German Ambassador to join him in bringing pressure to bear on the
Sultan. When America entered the war and he was recalled,
Morgenthau had returned to America to raise money and support
for the Armenian cause.
Embittered by his experience with the Ottoman government, but
inspired by the American experience and sharing the American
evangelical spirit, Morgenthau proposed that the Ottoman Empire
be converted into a federation of ethnically centered but heterogeneous democratic states that would have included Arabia, Armenia,
Cyprus, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and
Turkey. It would be the role of their federal government, not unlike
that established in Philadelphia in 1787, to maintain order among
these culturally distinct entities and conduct foreign affairs. His
plan was warmly supported by Protestant religious groups desiring
unfettered access to the Holy Land70 and by Armenians who had
relocated and organized to defend themselves. It was opposed by
Zionists for the reason that the plan did not fit with their ambition
to control a nation to be erected around Jerusalem, an ambition
Morgenthau deemed imprudent. Felix Frankfurter attended the
Conference as a representative of the American Zionists to advocate
68. SEGEV, supra note 55, at 118-19.
69. Id.
70. BEN HALPERN, A CLASH OF HEROES: BRANDEIS, WEIZMANN, AND AMERICAN ZIONISM
191-94 (1987).
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compliance with the promise of the Balfour Declaration, and he was
among the critics of Morgenthau’s proposal.71
Another American at Versailles was Howard Bliss, a founder of
the American University in Beirut.72 He had come on his own ticket
on behalf of those interested in Protestant missions in the Ottoman
region. He urged that the people of the region be asked what
solution they preferred. He was supported in this recommendation
by Prince Feisal.73 President Wilson had himself at the outset
protested against secret agreements made between Britain and
France dividing the Ottoman territories to be conquered and, in
light of his own former positions and declarations, he could hardly
disagree with the proposal. An effort was made to establish a
commission including French and British members to conduct the
factual inquiry. Neither Clemenceau nor Lloyd George could oppose
the idea of such a survey although both thought it “childish.”74 They
lent no support to the effort, and thought to divide the Ottoman
Empire between themselves. The relationship between them became
so estranged over the issue of Syria that Clemenceau at one point
challenged Lloyd George to a duel.75
When British and French cooperation was not forthcoming,
President Wilson appointed two notable Americans to seek out the
sentiments of those residing in the Ottoman territories.76 Henry
Churchill King was the President of Oberlin College, Charles Crane
a valve manufacturer who had early “decided to make an art and
science of traveling”77 and had made many trips to the Near East
over a period of many years. Both had connections to Protestant
missionary programs.78

71. Id.
72. SEGEV, supra note 55, at 120-21.
73. Id.
74. See FROMKIN, supra note 44, at 396-97.
75. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 436
(1992) (claiming that Clemenceau offered Lloyd George a choice of pistols or swords).
76. See HARRY N. HOWARD, THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION: AN AMERICAN INQUIRY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 31-36 (1963); SEGEV, supra note 55, at 120.
77. HOWARD, supra note 76, at 39.
78. JOSEPH L. GRABILL, PROTESTANT DIPLOMACY AND THE NEAR EAST: MISSIONARY
INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLICY 1810-1927, at 199-200, 230-33 (1971).
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III. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS: A TIME FOR PACIFISM
A problem that those interested in addressing the Ottoman
problem could not overcome was the domestic political situation in
the United States. It must have been on the mind of Colonel House
when he dismissed the idea of American involvement out of hand.
The recent history of the United States had cast grave doubt in the
public mind on the possibility that any good could come from
American engagement in the reconstruction of foreign lands. Most
visible to Americans in 1919 were the lessons learned from the 1898
war with Spain. As Colonel House recognized, they pointed the
American people away from any new imperial ventures.
A. The Splendid Little War79
That war with Spain had been occasioned by a revolution
sustained on the island of Cuba during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, largely by or on behalf of peasants and slaves
who were brutally suppressed.80 Because journalists provided
horrifying accounts of the many brutalities perpetrated in Spanish
concentration camps in Cuba on the impoverished revolutionaries
and their kin, popular support in America for the revolution became
widespread.81 Feeling pressed,82 President McKinley announced in
December 1897 that American patience with Spain’s governance of
Cuba was “not infinite.” In February, the press somehow acquired
and published a letter written by the Spanish Ambassador to the
United States to his superiors in Madrid commenting on McKinley’s
speech and describing the President as “weak and a bidder for the
79. The term was attributed to Secretary of State John Hay, but was widely used. See,
e.g., Letter from John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt (July 27, 1898), in 2 WILLIAM ROSCOE
THAYER, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN HAY 337 (19th impression 1915).
80. On the sad conditions prevailing on the island, see generally ARTHUR F. CORWIN,
SPAIN AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN CUBA 1817-1886 (1967); FRANKLIN W. KNIGHT, SLAVE
SOCIETY IN CUBA DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1970); SLAVES, SUGAR, AND COLONIAL
SOCIETY: TRAVEL ACCOUNTS OF CUBA, 1801-1899 (Louis A. Pérez, Jr. ed., 1992).
81. CHARLES H. BROWN, THE CORRESPONDENTS’ WAR: JOURNALISTS IN THE SPANISHAMERICAN WAR (1967); G.J.A. O’TOOLE, THE SPAINSH WAR: AN AMERICAN EPIC–1898, at 56,
146-47 (1984).
82. On McKinley as a pacifist, see JOHN DOBSON, RETICENT EXPANSIONISM: THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 6-17 (1988).

2008]

OTTOMAN REPUBLIC

1085

admiration of the crowd.”83 On February 15, the battleship Maine
exploded while on a peaceful visit to Havana, resulting in the deaths
of many seamen. The explosion was never explained and many
chose to believe that it was the result of a deliberate act by Spain.84
The explosion resulted in an ultimatum served on Spain demanding liberation of Cuba. When that was not forthcoming, Congress on
April 20 resolved that military intervention to establish a “free and
independent” Cuba was necessary.85 Leading the opposition to the
war was Orville Platt, a Republican Senator representing Connecticut.86 His objection was that the resolution recognized a Republic of
Cuba that did not exist. He denied that there was a government in
Cuba that could be recognized and insisted that the United States
military would have to remain there until it was satisfied that a
responsible government was in place.87
The war that Congress declared was splendid because it lasted
only 118 days. It resulted in few casualties and the lionization of
Theodore Roosevelt.88 As George Kennan would observe:
[T]he American people of that day, or at least many of their
more influential spokesmen, simply liked the smell of empire
and felt an urge to range themselves among the colonial powers
of the time, to see our flag flying on distant tropical isles, to feel
the thrill of foreign adventure and authority, to bask in the
sunshine of recognition as one of the great imperial powers of
the world.89

Indeed, America had with its stunning military victory established
itself as an imperial power. The peace treaty resulted not merely in
the liberation of Cuba but in the acquisition of former Spanish colonies in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, marking America
83. See ROBERT DALLEK, 1898: MCKINLEY’S DECISION, THE UNITED STATES DECLARES WAR
109-16 (1969).
84. For a full account, see H.G. RICKOVER, HOW THE BATTLESHIP MAINE WAS DESTROYED
(1976).
85. J. Res. 23, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 738-39 (1898).
86. Platt’s biography is LOUIS A. COOLIDGE, AN OLD-FASHIONED SENATOR: ORVILLE H.
PLATT OF CONNECTICUT: THE STORY OF A LIFE UNSELFISHLY DEVOTED TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE
(1910).
87. Id. at 260-61.
88. O’TOOLE, supra note 81, at 392-93.
89. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 17 (1951).
ON SPAIN
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as the new imperial power.90 But, as Colonel House recognized,91 the
smell of empire had by 1919 lost its fragrance.
B. Cuba
First, there was the experience as liberator of Cuba. The island
was occupied by the United States Army, the concentration camps
were opened, their prisoners were released, and a government
was established under the command of General Leonard Wood, a
medical doctor who favored the annexation of Cuba. Wood proved to
be highly energetic in imposing reforms on the Cuban people.92 His
administration rid the city of yellow fever by exterminating the
mosquitoes carrying the infection and greatly relieved the squalor
that the Spanish Empire had been powerless to reduce. General
Wood’s Havana may have for a time become the healthiest city in
the western hemisphere.93
But in 1901, to prod the establishment of a democratic republic,
Senator Platt attached a rider to the military appropriations bill
directing the War Department to secure the agreement of the
Republic of Cuba (if and when established) to the condition that the
United States would have an obligation to intervene if and when
democratic self-government on the island failed.94 Despite objections
by William Jennings Bryan and other anti-imperialists,95 the Platt
Amendment was written into the Cuban Constitution of 1902 and
into the treaty between the United States and Cuba.96 Thus, the
Cuban constitution was fitted with a provision bearing some
90. The treaty signed at Paris in 1899 provided that the former Spanish territories under
the control of the American military—the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico—would not be
returned to Spain and that the victorious United States would pursuant to Article III pay
vanquished Spain $20,000,000 for the right to exercise sovereignty over them. Treaty of
Peace, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 62, pt. 1 (1899), available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/spain/sp1898.htm.
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
92. See WHITNEY T. PERKINS, CONSTRAINT OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND CARIBBEAN
INTERVENTIONS 6-7 (1981).
93. DOBSON, supra note 82, at 132.
94. PERKINS, supra note 92, at 7-12; see also EDWARD S. KAPLAN, U.S. IMPERIALISM IN
LATIN AMERICA: BRYAN’S CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS, 1900-1920, at 12 (1998).
95. KENDRICK A. CLEMENTS, WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: MISSIONARY ISOLATIONIST 40-42
(1982).
96. O’TOOLE, supra note 81, at 399.
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resemblance to the provision of the Constitution of the United
States guaranteeing a republican form of government.97
On its face, as Bryan and others emphasized, the Platt
Amendment was an affront to the responsibility of Cuban citizens
for their own self-government. It proved to have the unwelcome
effect on Cuban domestic politics foreseen by Bryan and other
critics: it begot the disorders that it had been intended to prevent.98
A government of religious conservatives was elected in 1902 and reelected in 1906, but religious liberals questioned the vote counts,
leading to violent disorders and the resignation of the government.
Conservatives wanted the United States Marines to return to
suppress the disorder, while the liberals wanted them to return to
conduct an honest election.99 So the Marines returned to resolve the
chaos and re-liberate Cuba. And they would be summoned to return
a second time in 1908, and a third time in 1912, and yet a fourth
time in 1917.100 This was more than a little embarrassing; it was by
1919 obvious that American efforts to democratize Cuba were a
failure. Indeed, in 1934, the arrangement would be abrogated and
the island would be subjected to the dictatorship of Fulgencio
Batista, then to be followed by that of Fidel Castro.101
C. The Philippine Insurrection
Meanwhile, the experience in the Philippines was equally
disheartening to American imperialists. There had been no popular
clamor in the United States about the brutalities of the Spanish
Empire in that venue. There were rebels there, but American
journalists had not discovered them and the American Navy’s
intrusion into Manila Bay had not been planned in Washington.102
But Commodore George Dewey had attacked and sunk the Spanish
fleet in Manila Bay.103

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

DOBSON, supra note 82, at 134.
PERKINS, supra note 92, at 12-15.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 181-82, 184.
A. WHITNEY GRISWOLD, THE FAR EASTERN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 18-19 (1938).
For an account, see ROBERT CONROY, THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY: THE SPANISHAMERICAN WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES (1968).
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Gentle President McKinley acknowledged that he had been
deeply troubled by the issues of imperialism and had prayed for
wisdom in deciding what to do with the Philippines after his Navy
had won there.104 His prayer, he told a religious group, had been
answered by God, who advised him that America could not honorably return the Philippines to Spain, nor could it allow the Germans
to take them (as indeed Germany gave substantial evidence of
intending to do),105 and it was therefore a moral duty of the United
States to govern and protect the islands and prepare the people for
self-governance.106 He was enthusiastically supported by the national hero, Theodore Roosevelt, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,107
but there was vigorous protest by many anti-imperialists.108
Arguments for imperialism in that venue were soon subordinated
by the deeds of Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. Aguinaldo had been
leading a revolution against Spain, and in 1899 he redirected his
militancy against the United States.109 Before the naval battle had
occurred, E. Spencer Pratt, the American consul at Singapore, had
a secret meeting with Aguinaldo, a leader of a Filipino revolution
that had been underway since August of 1896. He arranged a
meeting between Dewey and Aguinaldo.110 Controversy remains
over whether promises were made by either Pratt or Dewey of an
alliance between Aguinaldo’s forces and the United States or of the
104. 2 CHARLES S. OLCOTT, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 110 (1916).
105. See Paul Johnson, Prayer in the White House, FORBES.COM, Nov. 28, 2005, http://
www.forbes.com/columnists/forbes/2005/1128/037.html (quoting President McKinley’s
prayerful resolution of the Philippines dilemma); on his political deliberations, see KENNETH
E. HENDRICKSON, JR., THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 66-67 (2003); on the German threat, see
O’TOOLE, supra note 81, at 191-92, 223, 364-66.
106. OLCOTT, supra note 104, at 109-11; on McKinley’s deliberations, see Ephraim K.
Smith, William McKinley’s Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of
the Philippine Islands, in CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRE: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND ITS
AFTERMATH 205 (James C. Bradford ed., 1993).
107. See WARREN ZIMMERMANN, FIRST GREAT TRIUMPH: HOW FIVE AMERICANS MADE THEIR
COUNTRY A WORLD POWER 13 (2002).
108. See generally ROBERT L. BEISNER, TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE: THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS:
1898-1900 (1968). The twelve notables identified included Andrew Carnegie, former President
Benjamin Harrison, and Mark Twain. Id. at xiii.
109. Accounts of the insurrection include: DAVID HOWARD BAIN, SITTING IN DARKNESS:
AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1984); STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, “BENEVOLENT
ASSIMILATION”: THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 (1982); see also
DOBSON, supra note 82, at 142-46.
110. See RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., RESPONSE TO IMPERIALISM 13-14 (1979).
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establishment of an independent Philippine Republic. In any case,
Aguinaldo assured his supporters that the Americans would
recognize his group as the government of the islands. That would
almost surely have been the result if a treaty amendment favored
by the anti-imperialists had been accepted.111 Aguinaldo explained
his expectation as resting on his own reading of the Constitution of
the United States: “I find in it no authority for colonies and I
[therefore] have no fear.”112
The president of Cornell University upon his return in 1900 from
an official visit to Manila observed that “we like big things in this
country, and we have gotten in the Orient a big archipelago.” The
author assured his readers that “[w]hat the best Filipinos want is
exactly what the best Americans want to give them .... It is the old
American story; absolute religious liberty, civil liberties, and all the
political franchises they are capable of exercising.”113 Such optimistic utterances confirmed in many American minds a missionary
spirit eager to share American values with the benighted Filipinos.
But by November 1899, it was obvious that President McKinley
did not plan to honor Aguinaldo’s declaration of Philippine independence, and the rebellion was renewed, this time against
American rule and in the form of guerrilla warfare.114 The American
military set about the task of suppressing Aguinaldo’s army. This
was necessarily to be done by a volunteer army. The pay for an
enlisted private in the U.S. military was dismal. At $15.60 per
month, it was less than half that of a steelworker employed by
Andrew Carnegie and only a third of the salary earned by a teacher
in rural America.115 Men nonetheless volunteered for the duty
for reasons of patriotism,116 adventure-seeking, and a desire to
demonstrate manliness.117 Most were young, white, single, and
uneducated.118 Some labor leaders urged them to come forward,
111. The debate is summarized in BEISNER, supra note 108, at 215-39.
112. Thomas M. Anderson, Our Rule in the Philippines, 170 N. AM. REV. 272, 277 (1900).
113. Jacob G. Schurman, The Philippines, 9 YALE L.J. 215, 215, 219 (1900).
114. WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES
AND PUERTO RICO 1898-1905, at 53-55 (1989).
115. GLENN ANTHONY MAY, BATTLE FOR BATANGAS: A PHILIPPINE PROVINCE AT WAR 138
(1991).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 138-41.
118. Id. at 138.
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saying, “The laboring man is patriotic, and he does not forget …
[that] laboring men constitute the great body of the army which will
not forsake the flag and turn traitor in the hour of extremity.”119
Even young black Americans volunteered for duty, it being explained by the editor of a Washington weekly that an African
American “was first of all an American and would fight beside his
white brother wherever it was necessary.”120
In the months leading up to the presidential election in 1900,
Aguinaldo hoped that intensifying the insurrection would lead to a
Democratic victory: “In America there is a great party that insists
on the United States government recognizing Filipino independence.”121 He predicted that “[t]he great Democratic Party of the
United States will win the next fall election…. Imperialism will fail
in its mad attempts to subjugate us by force of arms.”122 Hedging his
prediction, Aguinaldo’s instructions to the revolutionaries included
executing people, and wounded American GIs were often put to
death rather than held as POWs.
Contrary to Aguinaldo’s forecast, McKinley won reelection in
1900. Many concerns were elevated when, shortly after his inauguration for a second term, the burden of responsibility was taken
from McKinley by an anarchist-assassin. Prior to the 1900 campaign, Vice President Hobart had died, and McKinley had been
importuned to take the luminous hero, Colonel Roosevelt, as a
running mate. Not only was Roosevelt the Governor of New York,
but he was “the most famous man in America,”123 so McKinley had
yielded to popular demand in making the choice. Roosevelt thus
acceded to the Presidency at the age of forty-two. No one expected
him to surrender any power acquired in his splendid war.
But even President Roosevelt could not still the insurgency. The
difficulty of fighting against guerilla fighters was the American

119. WELCH, supra note 110, at 86 (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
120. Id. at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. H. W. BRANDS, BOUND TO EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES 54 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. On the origins of this description, see EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 662-87 (1979).
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soldiers’ “inability to distinguish guerillas from noncombatants.”124
One captain complained that:
[W]hen a small force stops in a village to rest the people all greet
you with kindly expressions, while the same ones slip away, go
out into the bushes, get their guns, and waylay you further down
the road. You rout them & scatter them; they hide their guns
and take to their houses & claim to be amigos.125

In March of 1901, one colonel wrote, “[a] year ago, ... I believed that
the insurgents were going to pieces. They are no more in pieces
today than then.”126 An estimated 126,500 Americans served in the
Philippine-American War, over 4200 of whom were killed.127 Its
financial cost far exceeded the cost of the war with Spain.
The United States responded to this “amigo warfare”128 with
draconian measures. General Bell, who was put in charge of
pacifying the Batangas and Laguna provinces, announced that
“[h]enceforth no one will be permitted to be neutral;”129 essentially,
the message was that the Filipinos were either with the Americans,
or they were against them.130 Bell closed ports, restricted travel and
trade, allowed his troops to commandeer transportation, and
required the rich caciques to pay a fine to avoid being forced to
work.131 He also organized “protected zones” where Filipinos from
outlying areas were to be relocated.132 Affected citizens were given
about two weeks to bring as much of their animals, rice, and
possessions as possible; after that time, remaining property and
livestock were subject to confiscation by the American military. 133

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

MAY, supra note 115, at 142.
Id.
Id. at 161 (alteration in original).
See DOBSON, supra note 82, at 142-46; WELCH, supra note 110, at 42.
Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Philippine-American War: Friendship and Forgetting, in
VESTIGES OF WAR: THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR AND THE AFTERMATH OF AN IMPERIAL
DREAM 1899-1999, at 3, 7 (Angel Velasco Shaw & Luis H. Francia eds., 2002).
129. Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See id. at 11-12.
131. See BRIAN MCALLISTER LINN, THE U.S. ARMY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE
PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902 (1989).
132. In one military document, the word “concentration camp” is crossed out. Ileto, supra
note 128, at 12.
133. LINN, supra note 131, at 154.
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Efforts were at times made to minimize the ordeal for those
Filipinos affected, but food shortages and sanitation that “ranged
from poor to appalling” nevertheless resulted.134 Sixteen to twenty
thousand Filipinos are estimated to have been killed in combat, and
with the inclusion of those dying from war-related causes such as
starvation and disease, one estimate has the total death toll at
200,000.135 Destruction of property was also great; it was often done
for punitive reasons. Even noncombatants who simply had contact
with enemy forces would often see their homes torched.136
Physical torture was also used. One particularly heinous practice
was known as “the water cure.” A syringe was forced into the mouth
of a prisoner or suspect, and water was forced down his throat until
his stomach expanded. This created the sensation that the person
was drowning, causing a person to talk.137 Even the protected zones
were not free of atrocities. Inhabitants of one zone complained that
the women were sexually assaulted by soldiers and threatened with
imprisonment and death if they resisted.
In July of 1901, the transfer from military to civil law was
consummated by the inauguration of William Howard Taft as the
new civil governor of the Philippines. This caused a moment of
optimism. But on September 28th, a band of insurrectos killed
thirty-eight American soldiers who were eating breakfast in the
town of Balangiga.138 The assault was led by the town’s police chief
and a local priest was a conspirator.139
General Jake Smith was given command of the troops assigned
to retaliate for the assault at Balangiga.140 He believed that the
population of the island of Samar was uniformly disloyal and
ordered that all males over ten should be executed and the island
turned into a “howling wilderness.”141 Though some officers did
not follow Smith’s orders, several did. A major, who would later
claim that he was simply following orders from Smith, executed
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

WELCH, supra note 110, at 139.
Id. at 42.
MAY, supra note 115, at 149.
Id. at 147.
WELCH, supra note 110, at 40-41.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Brian McAllister Linn, The Struggle for Sumar, in CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRE: THE SPANISHAMERICAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 171 (James C. Bradford ed., 1993).
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eleven native guides.142 A captain executed seven prisoners at
Borongonan.143 Another major kidnapped citizens, tortured suspects
(including three priests), and was a conspirator in the killing of at
least ten Filipinos.144
Word of the atrocities began to trickle out in the pages of
American newspapers in 1901 and 1902.145 The Atlanta Constitution
began to ask if atrocities could be traced back to the administration,
even suggesting that Roosevelt and Secretary of War Root were
“coparceners with the Jake Smith campaign of torture and
murder.”146 On Memorial Day, President Roosevelt gave a speech
castigating those whom were “walking delicately” in the “soft places
of the earth” while criticizing the American soldier, whose face was
“marred by sweat and blood.”147 Secretary of War Elihu Root
declared that the journalists’ reports of rape and torture were
either unfounded or greatly exaggerated, and explained that any
misconduct was a consequence of the barbarism of the uncivilized
Filipinos.148 Congress did at last conduct hearings and on April 14th,
1902, two soldiers from Massachusetts testified about the water
cure, claiming that the information obtained was then used to burn
down an entire town, leaving its ten thousand citizens with only the
clothing they had on their backs. Moorfield Storey, the president of
the American Bar Association, then presided over an investigation
that led to numerous courts-martial.149 General Smith was convicted
and sentenced not to repeat his misdeed, and was dismissed from
the service by the President.150
Aguinaldo was captured in 1902, but the insurrection lasted
seven years.151 It was waged on a scale comparable to the better
remembered Vietnam venture. Whatever hope of national honor and

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

WELCH, supra note 110, at 138.
Linn, supra note 141, at 172.
Id.
WELCH, supra note 110, at 133-36.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 144-45.
BRANDS, supra note 121, at 56.
MOORFIELD STOREY & JULIAN CODMAN, SECRETARY ROOT’S RECORD: MARKED
SEVERITIES IN PHILIPPINE WARFARE—AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW AND FACTS BEARING ON
ACTIONS AND UTTERANCES OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND SECRETARY ROOT (1902).
150. MILLER, supra note 109, at 255.
151. See DOBSON, supra note 82, at 142-46.
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dignity some Americans nourished in their support of the imperial
venture was substantially dispelled by this squalid struggle.
Meanwhile, William Howard Taft, as governor of the Philippines,
presided over a seven-member governing commission appointed
by the President.152 It was Secretary Root who drafted its directive;
his orders were to establish the rule of law and individual freedom.
The Filipinos would be required to accept these principles “for the
sake of their liberty and happiness.” Yet, the Commission “should
bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is
designed, not for our satisfaction ... but for the happiness, peace and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits,
and even their prejudices.”153 Privately, Taft described the ruling
class caciques as “ambitious as Satan and quite as unscrupulous,”154
and the peasant taos as “utterly unfit for self-government.” The
ruling class were generally descendants of Spanish dons who
maintained feudal estates that were increasingly prosperous as a
result of the sugar quota which guaranteed their owners profitable
exports to the American market. American efforts to uplift the poor
and the ignorant got little sympathy from caciques. Many practiced
extortion and embezzlement, habits that had been tolerated for
centuries by viceroys from Madrid. Filipino judges shamelessly
punished innocent rivals and exonerated their kinsmen and friends
of obvious guilt, often falsely attributing their corrupt decisions to
orders from American officers.155
As in Cuba and elsewhere, differences of class were reinforced by
racial and ethnic differences.156 The caciques, while descendants of
dons, were generally mestizo of indigenous and Chinese origins.157
The taos whom they held in peonage were members of numerous
ethnic groups who spoke in as many as eighty different languages
or dialects sufficiently distinct to preclude communication among

152. On Taft’s service on the Philippine Commission, see id. at 145-46.
153. 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 356 (1938).
154. STEPHEN GRAUBARD, COMMAND OF OFFICE 107 (2004) (quoting LEWIS LAPHAM,
THEATER OF WAR 77-79 (2002)).
155. KATHERINE MAYO, THE ISLES OF FEAR: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES 10-15
(1925).
156. Id.
157. MAYO, supra note 155, at 10.
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them. Also, religious differences were keenly felt.158 Indeed, the
Moros, who were Muslims, spoke their own language and were
matriarchal in their sexual mores, were deeply offended if described
as Filipinos, a tribe whom they reviled.159 Such ethnic groups on the
large southern island of Mindanao felt no connection to those of
Luzon, the large northern island.160 In 1906, there was a new civil
war in the South waged by people having no connection to
Aguinaldo, and requiring yet another dispatch of American military
forces.161
When Woodrow Wilson was elected to the presidency in 1912,
many Filipinos expected an immediate transfer of sovereignty to
themselves, for many Democratic legislators had professed to
favor such a transfer. Moreover, Wilson had named William
Jennings Bryan as his Secretary of State. Bryan had campaigned
against imperialism as a presidential candidate in 1896, 1900, and
1908, and in 1898 had vigorously opposed the retention of the
Philippines.162
Wilson appointed Francis Burton Harrison, a Congressman from
New York, as Governor General of the Philippines. Harrison had
served with Roosevelt in Cuba as a member of the New Yorkers’
Rough Rider Regiment.163 Harrison was soon genuinely enamored
of Filipinos.164 He brought word that America would surrender
sovereignty and that “[e]very step we take will be taken with a view
to the ultimate independence of the islands.”165 Congress in 1916
ratified President Wilson’s promise of future independence.166
Meanwhile, in 1915 Robert Lansing succeeded William Jennings
Bryan as Secretary of State. Lansing had been previously involved
in East Asian matters.167 He proposed the transfer of the Philippines
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

DEAN C. WORCESTER, THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT 660-61 (1914).
See generally MAYO, supra note 155, at 292-341.
Id. at 315.
MORRIS, supra note 123, at 157-58.
See generally WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, BRYAN ON IMPERIALISM: SPEECHES,
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND INTERVIEWS (Charles Gregg ed., 1900); KAPLAN, supra note 94.
163. Anne Cipriano Venzon, Francis Burton Harrison, in 10 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 208 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
164. Id. at 209.
165. FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, THE CORNERSTONE OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE: A
NARRATIVE OF SEVEN YEARS 50 (1922).
166. STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA’S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 246-47 (1989).
167. BURTON F. BEERS, VAIN ENDEAVOR: ROBERT LANSING’S ATTEMPTS TO END THE
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to Japan, partly as a means of calming the Japanese appetite for
expansion on the continent of Asia, and partly because he regarded
continuing American involvement in the Philippines as a signal of
imperial ambitions evoking mistrust on the part of other nations,
especially Japan, a nation he regarded as a much more attractive
market for American goods than the Philippines.168 It seemed
possible that such a transfer might have been made in September
1917 when Lansing began engaging in extensive negotiations with
the Japanese, but in light of the collapse of Russia169 and entry of
both Japan and the United States into the European war, the
proposal was not presented or discussed. In hindsight, it might seem
that Lansing was possibly on to something. The likelihood of the
attacks on China that began fourteen years later, or on Pearl
Harbor twenty-four years later, would have been reduced if Japan
had been challenged with the task of assimilating the Philippines
to its empire.
It would be harsh to condemn as a total failure the missionary
efforts of thousands of Americans who served in the Philippines in
the quarter century after the islands had been pacified.170 But there
was little about America’s later experience in the Philippines to
justify the decisions made in 1898. That did not deter President
Bush in 2003 from citing the Philippines as a model for what the
United States could do for Iraq or other nations or peoples lucky
enough to be subjected to American rule for forty years.171
D. Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico was the last Spanish colony to be invaded. Its
“liberation” was casual and almost painless to Americans. The
Spanish army resisted briefly, resulting in sixteen wounded
Americans and six Spanish dead.172 The troops encountered landAMERICAN-JAPANESE RIVALRY 3 (1962).
168. Id. at 109.
169. On the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on American policy in East Asia, see id. at
130-33.
170. For a full account, see KARNOW, supra note 166.
171. David E. Sanger, Bush Cites Philippines as Model in Rebuilding Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2003, at N1.
172. WALTER MILLIS, THE MARTIAL SPIRIT 342-43 (1931). For a description of the campaign,
see FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LITTLE WAR 185-91 (1958).
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owners of mixed origins who worked their land with peasants of
predominantly African ancestry.173 Few Spaniards had chosen the
island as a home, and the King had taken little interest in it once it
became clear that there was no gold to be had.174 In 1868, there had
been a failed revolution by peasants and slaves.175 In 1873, in
response to international pressure, slavery was abolished, but this
did little to improve the conditions in which the peasants lived.176
The freemen and other laborers were required to carry a libreta, a
notebook in which their debts to their employers could be
recorded.177 It was little wonder that many campesinos not only
welcomed the American invasion but took the occasion to sack the
property of their oppressors.
There were at the time of their “liberation” almost a million
Puerto Ricans; this number included about 30,000 Europeans and
about 360,000 blacks, and the rest were mestizo.178 Almost all lived
in desperate rural poverty. Electricity, pure water, sewers, health
care, literacy and roads were rare. To get crops to market, oxen were
used to pull wagons, sometimes on rails.
President McKinley seems not to have consulted God about the
decision to acquire Puerto Rico. It was included in the treaty with
Spain as “indemnity” to the United States for the cost of the war of
liberation, but then it paid cash to Spain to seal the deal. The
French Ambassador asked how McKinley’s demand could be
reconciled to the President’s disavowal of territorial ambitions; the
President had no answer.179 A Congressman later explained that
Puerto Rico was needed in order to turn the Gulf of Mexico into an
American lake.180 By 1916, it was said to be the key to the defense

173. RONALD FERNANDEZ, THE DISENCHANTED ISLAND: PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 29 (2d ed. 1996).
174. Id.
175. OLGA JIMÉNEZ DE WAGENHEIM, PUERTO RICO’S REVOLT FOR INDEPENDENCE: EL GRITO
DE LARES 115-16 (1985).
176. Id. at 116; see also FERNANDEZ, supra note 173, at 32.
177. JAMES L. DIETZ, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 42-53 (1986).
178. JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
15 (1997).
179. CARMELO ROSARIO NATAL, PUERTO RICO Y LA CRISIS DE LA GUERRA HISPANOAMERICANA
(1895-1898), at 262 (1989).
180. 44 CONG. REC. H2926 (statement of Rep. Cooper).
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of the continent against aggression from Europe.181 But in truth, no
plausible reason of self-interest has ever been supplied for the
United States to retain dominion over the island other than the
expectation that colonized Puerto Ricans, however destitute, might
buy American goods.182
The military commander proclaimed that he “found it necessary
... to advert in strong terms to the general unfitness ... of the people
for self-government.”183 A Puerto Rican witness testified that “[t]he
[American] occupation has been a perfect failure. We have suffered
everything. No liberty, no rights, absolutely no protection.... We are
Mr. Nobody from Nowhere.”184 The new civil government was
therefore conducted by the War Department in Washington. It
embarked on a program of education, but in English. The United
States Commissioner of Education protested that the “American
teachers at the outset were mostly young men who came to Porto
Rico with the American army. None of them knew Spanish, and
some of them knew little English.”185 The English language program
was nevertheless supported by the local party opposing the resident
landowners. Many children did soon learn, if not English, at least
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and sing The Star Spangled
Banner, and perhaps the words of Jefferson and Lincoln.186
The military government was soon replaced by civilians.
President Theodore Roosevelt first appointed William H. Hunt, a
Montanan, to serve as governor. Hunt selected laws previously
enacted in California, Montana, and Idaho and, with the consent of
other presidential appointees, proclaimed them to be the law of
Puerto Rico.187 The laws he decreed would control such matters as
municipal government, taxation, the school system, and the governance of the University of Puerto Rico. They could not be modified

181. PEDRO A. CABÁN, CONSTRUCTING A COLONIAL PEOPLE 201-03 (1999).
182. MONGE, supra note 178, at 41.
183. GEORGE W. DAVIS, REPORT ON CIVIL AFFAIRS IN PUERTO RICO, H.R. DOC. NO. 56-2, at
481 (1900).
184. MONGE, supra note 178, at 40 (third alteration in original).
185. M. G. BRUMBAUGH, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION FOR PORTO RICO,
H.R. DOC. NO. 57-5, at 498 (1901).
186. MONGE, supra note 178, at 55.
187. Id. at 56-57.
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by those elected to represent the people without the approval of
federal officials.188
In 1904, a new Unionist party was organized to seek some form
of self-government for Puerto Ricans.189 They were dismissed by
Governor Hunt as persons having “no acquaintance with the new
National power.”190 They nevertheless swept the elections to the
legislature. They were led by Luis Muñoz Rivera, a journalist who
had agitated for independence from Spain, and who would for four
decades be the leading voice for Puerto Rican autonomy and
eventual independence. In 1905, the party asked for a plebiscite on
the political status of the island, but their request was rejected by
President Roosevelt.191
In 1906, President Roosevelt appointed a protegé, Regis Post, first
as secretary, and then as governor of the island to succeed Hunt.
The Puerto Rican reaction to Post as governor was to elect a lower
house composed exclusively of persons that Post had denounced as
“extremists.”192
In response to such behavior, President Taft declaimed to
Congress that although the United States had provided the Puerto
Ricans with schools, 452 miles of macadamized roads, medicine, and
free trade as gifts, they had proven themselves not only ungrateful
but also incapable of self-government. He therefore recommended
that the territorial government be stripped of its powers to tax and
appropriate, powers it could in any case exercise only with the
approval of the federal governor.193 He explained that Puerto Ricans
could not have either independence or statehood and also continue
to enjoy the generosity of Congress. This would be “to eat their cake
and have it, too.”194

188. Id.
189. Id. at 59.
190. WILLIAM H. HUNT, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO, S. DOC.
NO. 58-35, at 32 (1904).
191. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS 51 (1905).
192. REGIS POST, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO, H.R. DOC. NO.
61-103, at 25 (1909).
193. William Howard Taft, Message Concerning Affairs in Porto Rico, reprinted in 1
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 88, 92-96 (1910).
194. MONGE, supra note 178, at 65.
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In 1917, President Wilson announced his support for the plan to
confer American citizenship on Puerto Ricans.195 A new reason to be
given was that it would make the Puerto Ricans less likely to align
themselves with the aspiring German Empire. The law was enacted
on the eve of World War I, the President declaring that “[w]e welcome the new citizen, not as a stranger, but as one entering his
father’s house.”196 Muñoz Rivera and his followers opposed the
citizenship bill as an impediment to national independence, but
leaders of the labor movement favored it as a means of access to
more protective labor laws. Congress allowed Puerto Ricans
specifically to reject citizenship if they did so within a stated period
of time,197 but only 288 did so, despite the fact that Puerto Ricans
were in 1917 subjected to selective military service. The act
conferring citizenship also created a bicameral legislature locally
elected, but a veto power remained with the federal governor.
In 1918, the new legislature petitioned for a plebiscite to determine what political status was desired by the Puerto Rican
people.198 While a joint resolution to that effect was introduced in
Congress, no action was taken.199 As America went to war in Europe
to make it safe for democracy, it had little to show in Puerto Rico to
assure others as to how that safety might be achieved by American
arms. Puerto Rico was being groomed neither for independence, nor
for statehood.
From the perspective of Versailles in 1919, one considering the
results of the 1898 war and the ensuing two decades of efforts to
establish self-government in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico
would have concluded that few positive results for America or for
the peoples to be governed would be likely to result from American
intervention in former Ottoman territories. America had failed to
impart democracy to indigenous tribes in North America. It had
failed to reconstruct the South. And it had failed to establish
democratic traditions in Cuba or in the Philippines or in Puerto
195. FERNANDEZ, supra note 173, at 70-71.
196. Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Arthur Yager (Apr. 1, 1917), in 41 THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON 515-16 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983).
197. Jones Act, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). Frequently amended, this complex
legislation is now codified as 48 U.S.C. § 737 (2000).
198. MONGE, supra note 178, at 79.
199. Id.
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Rico. Indeed, in 1908 a widely read professor of constitutional law
at Princeton firmly concluded that
[s]elf-government is not a mere form of institutions .... It is a
form of character.... [It] is not a thing that can be “given” to any
people .... No people can be “given” the self-control of maturity....
We of all people in the world should know these fundamental
things .... To ignore them would be not only to fail and fail
miserably, but to fail ridiculously and belie ourselves.200

It is astonishing to consider that the author of those words would
within a decade, as President of the United States, declare a war to
make the whole world safe for democracy.
E. Deflating Presidential Rhetoric
Woodrow Wilson, entering the presidency in 1913, not only
promised independence to the Philippines, but also, in disregard of
the caution he had expressed as a lawyer-political scientist in 1908,
announced that the primary aim of his foreign policy was “the
development of constitutional democracy abroad.”201 “I am going to
teach the South American republics to elect good men!”, he told
Congress.202 As President, Wilson had been attracted to ventures in
Mexico203 and the Caribbean204 that were resented in those venues
as imperialistic. And his anglophilia moved him to share the
concerns of those worried about the future of the British Empire in
its engagement on the continent of Europe that began in 1914.205

200. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 52-53
(Gaunt, Inc. 1997) (1907).
201. TONY SMITH, AMERICA’S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 60-64 (1994); see also N. GORDON
LEVIN, JR., WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD POLITICS: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO WAR AND
REVOLUTION 2-5, 13 (1968); HARLEY NOTTER, THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
WOODROW WILSON 460-61 (1965).
202. Woodrow Wilson, The Ideals of America, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1902, at 66.
203. See generally HALDEEN BRADDY, PERSHING’S MISSION IN MEXICO (1966).
204. See KAPLAN, supra note 94, at 144-45. See generally BRUCE J. CALDER, THE IMPACT OF
INTERVENTION: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924 (1984);
ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH, HAITI UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL, 1915-1930 (1931).
205. See JOSEPH P. TUMULTY, WOODROW WILSON AS I KNOW HIM 229-31 (1921).
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Wilson had appointed Bryan as his secretary of state. Bryan was
a veteran of military service in 1898 who viewed the anglophilia of
the President and others as economically motivated and unwise.206
He had opposed intervention in the Philippines and was stern in his
belief in the Miltonian principle:
[We have] sought to aid the world by example.... We have been
the friend of all nations and the counselor of many .... [To enter
the war] would not be an ascent to a higher plane; it would be a
descent and would impair our influence and jeopardize our
moral prestige.... [W]e cannot afford to exchange the moral
influence which we now have for the military glory of all the
empires that have risen and fallen since time began.207

Bryan repeatedly devised plans for settling the ongoing war, which
was proving to be disastrous for every one of the participating
empires. In 1915, he resigned in protest over the President’s
militancy in responding to German submarines attacking transatlantic traffic bearing arms as well as passengers to Britain and
France.208
With the support of Bryan’s successor, Secretary Lansing, Wilson
led the United States into the European war in April 1917, soon
after the fall of the Russian czarist regime with whom he could not
bring himself and the nation to ally. The rhetoric he would employ
to bring the nation to accept that decision would prove to be perhaps
the best resource available to Ambassador Morgenthau and the
Protestant missionaries who shared the desire to reconstruct the
Ottoman Empire as a multicultural democracy. The President not
only proclaimed the war to be one to make the world “safe for
democracy,”209 but that the truce reached on the battlefield in
November 1918 was based on agreement that peace would be

206. CLEMENTS, supra note 95, at 24-25; Merle Eugene Curti, Bryan and World Peace, 16
SMITH C. STUD. HIST. 111, 195-96 (1931).
207. LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH: WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: THE LAST
DECADE, 1915-1925, at 29-30 (1965) (internal quotations omitted). Bryan was not alone. See,
e.g., 55 CONG. REC. 223-34 (1917) (detailing Senator LaFollette’s opposition to the declaration
of war).
208. CLEMENTS, supra note 95, at 108-11.
209. His speech explaining the need to declare war is recorded in 41 PAPERS OF WOODROW
WILSON 519-25 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1983).
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negotiated in conformity with the political principles espoused by
Wilson in his Fourteen Points.210 On his way to the negotiations,
Wilson visited the English church to which his grandfather had
been minister; while there, he uttered extemporaneous remarks
that were widely reported and further elevated his celebrity role in
London and Paris. He spoke of his mother who had been baptized in
that church as one who spoke “stern lessons of duty.”211 He said that
the world sought a return to that path, away “from the savagery of
interest to the dignity of performance of right.”212 And he spoke as
only an American leader was likely to speak of the sources of right:
“Like the rivulets gathering into the river and the river into the
seas, there come from communities like this streams that fertilize
the consciences of men, and it is the conscience of the world that we
are trying to place upon the throne which others would usurp.”213
Wilson, thus taking the role of savior of Europe and dismantler
of its empires, proceeded to try to organize the peace. Georges
Clemenceau and David Lloyd-George shared a measure of contempt
for Wilson.214 They assumed responsibility for dictating terms of
peace to punish the peoples whose governments had opposed
them and to enlarge their own empires with no regard for Wilson’s
Fourteen Points. The only significant concession to Wilson was their
agreement to form the League of Nations.
That Bryan was, at least at the time, right and Wilson wrong in
the decision to enter the World War, is the view that has since often
prevailed.215 Certainly Versailles was a disaster of global proportions, as many who were there recognized at the time.216 It is not
210. See AUGUST HECKSHER, WOODROW WILSON 468-72 (1991).
211. Remarks at His Grandfather’s Church in Carlisle, December 19, 1918, in 53 PAPERS
OF WOODROW WILSON 559, 565 (Arthur Link ed., 1985).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 1 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 224-36 (1939); GEORGE
BROWN TINDALL, WITH DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 1008 (3d ed. 1992).
215. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, THE DEVIL THEORY OF WAR (1936); EDWIN M. BORCHARD
& WILLIAM POTTER LAGE, NEUTRALITY FOR THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1940); C. HARTLEY
GRATTAN, WHY WE FOUGHT (1929); KENNAN, supra note 89, at 69; MILLIS, supra note 172;
MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 200 (1998);
TUCHMAN, supra note 26.
216. See generally MACMILLAN, supra note 75; see also Jan Smuts, Gen. Smuts of South
Africa Estimating President Wilson’s Place in History, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1921, at 11; and
the quotes of Felix Frankfurter in BAKER, supra note 59.
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fanciful to observe Hitler and the Holocaust as a foreseeable
consequence of the self-indulgence of those who had not won a war
but merely survived it and who had little ambition to prevent its
repetition.
IV. THE FINAL SOLUTION FOR THE OTTOMAN PROBLEM
A. The San Remo Agreement
No decision was reached at Versailles regarding the disposition
of Ottoman territory except that the matter should be placed on
the agenda of the new League of Nations, which could be expected
to designate allied powers to accept temporary “mandates” over
specified areas. But in March 1920, at San Remo, while Wilson lay
stricken, Britain and France agreed without awaiting the KingCrane Report to a division of the territory.217 They agreed that the
monarchy of Feisal would be recognized as the independent
government of that part of the Arabian peninsula not previously
subjected to British “protection,” and that France would receive the
mandate to govern Lebanon and Syria, with Britain remaining in
Mesopotamia (Iraq)218 and Palestine.219 These mandates would be
continued until each region was ready for self-rule, however long
that might take.220 It was also agreed that the terms of the Balfour
Declaration would be incorporated into a peace treaty with the
Sultan.221 This last was done in the Treaty of Sèvres signed in
August 1920.222 But the Sultan was soon overthrown by a revolution, requiring that a new treaty be made in 1923 with his successors, led by President Mustapha Kemal, whose writ no longer ran
to Palestine.223

217. FROMKIN, supra note 44, at 396-99.
218. Notwithstanding that there was reportedly an insurrection under way there. See
generally AYLMER L. HALDANE, THE INSURRECTION IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1920 (1922).
219. FROMKIN, supra note 44, at 410-11.
220. Id. at 11.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. The British still occupied the territory. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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B. The King-Crane Report
The King-Crane Report that had been commissioned by President
Wilson at Versailles to study the popular will in Ottoman territories224 was filed with the United States Department of State in
July 1920. By that time, the President was too disabled to read it.
It was not published until 1922.225 Despite its lack of influence at
the time, its observations are pertinent to the question posed in this
Essay.
Based on conversations at many mosques and hundreds of
petitions, King-Crane reported that most Arabs perceived that they
could not without help maintain a government of their own because
they were too divided into hostile sects and tribes.226 They certainly
did not welcome a return of the Turks,227 who manifested no
ambition to return, but who were confident of their abilities to
manage affairs in Asia Minor, at least once they evicted their
Armenian and Greek Orthodox minorities. And, indeed, the Turks
proved their point by establishing a stable, secular constitutional
republic that abides in the 21st century.228
Also, it was reported that there was nearly universal hostility
among Arabs to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.229
Because of the Balfour Declaration, most Arabs wanted no part in
the British Empire. The only persons in the Ottoman territories
who reportedly welcomed British rule were many of the 100,000
Jewish people of Palestine who were attracted to Britain by the
Declaration.230 The population of Mesopotamia, being remote
from Palestine, reportedly cared less about the Balfour policy and

224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
HOWARD, supra note 76, at 311.
Id. at 220-36.
On the deficiencies of Ottoman government of the area, see generally GÖKHAN
ÇETINSAYA, OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION OF IRAQ, 1890-1908 (2006).
228. ZÜRCHER, supra note 49. On the constitution of Turkey, see generally Ergun
Özburdun, Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 19, 19-46 (Tuğrul Ansay
& Dan Wallace, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 2005). It continues to experience stress over the presence of
a Kurdish minority and over the relationship of the elected government to the Muslim clergy.
See generally SONER CAGAPTAY, ISLAM, SECULARISM AND NATIONALISM IN MODERN TURKEY
(2006).
229. See HOWARD, supra note 76, at 93.
230. See id. at 102-03.
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thought British rule preferable to self-rule, or rule by Turkey or
France.
Arabic-speaking people apparently did not admire the French.
Feisal foretold that Syrians would prefer death to a French mandate
because rule in the French Empire was deemed oppressive, not least
because imperial subjects were required to learn French.231 The only
groups who favored French rule were the Maronite Catholics found
in Lebanon.232
Astonishingly, King and Crane reported that most persons living
in Arabia, Armenia, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria preferred to be
in the custody of the United States, so that America could do for
them what it had allegedly done or was doing for the peoples of the
Philippines. They may also have sensed that a nation committed to
Jeffersonian principles of self-government would find it difficult to
impose massive immigration on a subordinate people who did not
welcome it. King-Crane agreed:
To subject [the Arab people] to unlimited Jewish immigration,
and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the
land, would be a gross violation of the principle [of free acceptance set forth by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points], and
of the people’s rights, though it kept within the forms of law.233

This was a categorical rejection of the Zionist premise that the
Holy Land belonged not to the millions of Arabs who lived there but
to the millions of Jews who revered it. It was also a clear expression
of Jeffersonian principles. Although King and Crane claimed to have
commenced their work in favor of the Zionist idea, they reported
that the facts on the ground were preclusive, for neither Christians
nor Muslems trusted the prospective Jewish immigrants as
impartial guardians of holy places.234 A zone near the holy sites
might be restricted to Jewish residents, they agreed, but primary
reliance should be placed on absolute freedom of religion to be
practiced throughout the region.235
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 236.
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The King-Crane Report concluded that at least Syria, Palestine,
and Lebanon, in keeping with the wishes of their citizens, should
not be separated236 but should be governed as a single federation
with a monarch and a parliament, preferably under the mandate of
the United States, but if that was not available, then of Britain.
Anticipating American resistance to the burden of such an imperial
responsibility, the King-Crane Report further concluded that
American optimism was needed to destroy the “cynicism and
disillusionment” rampant in the region. The United States itself
might be saved from “a disastrous reaction” against its “generally
high aims in the war” if it would involve itself in Near Eastern
affairs. Although the costs might indeed be heavy, “America might
well spend millions to insure relations of peace and good will among
nations, rather than the billions required for another war, sure to
come if the present cynical selfishness and lack of good will are not
checked.”237
Congress never considered the King-Crane proposal. Legislation
was introduced to accept a mandate from the League of Nations to
provide a secure government of Armenia.238 That proposal never
came to a vote, and Armenia was assimilated into the Soviet
Union.239 Recent experience, it seems, had taught Congress the
wisdom of Milton and Thayer.
At the same time, Justice Brandeis and his American followers
for similar reasons withdrew their early support for Zionism as it
seemed that the international organization led by Chaim Weizmann
was intent on governing the holy land without regard for the welfare
or sensitivities of the Palestinian Arabs. Weizmann dismissed these
American concerns as an effort to extend the Monroe Doctrine to
Palestine.240
CONCLUSION
Given the present state of affairs in the Middle East, it may
be instructive to reconsider the missionary proposals of Henry
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 238 (internal quotation omitted).
ZÜRCHER, supra note 49, at 152.
Id. at 171-72.
REINHARZ, supra note 53, at 225.
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Morgenthau, Howard Bliss, and the authors of the King-Crane
Report. Their willingness to impose a federal, democratic constitution on the nations of the Middle East was resistant to the advice
of Milton and Thayer. They did not draw the lesson that many
Americans drew, and continue to draw, from the failures of the
military ventures in 1898, and the two decades that followed, to
achieve their lofty goals. Nevertheless, with hindsight, could
Morgenthau, Bliss, King and Crane have been right? Might there be
a time or a place when the then recent experience is misleading,
when indeed intervention to make a place safe for democracy is
justified? If there is such a time and place, the Ottoman Empire in
collapse might have been that time and place, given the circumstances that prevailed then and there. But as promised at the outset
of this Essay, I leave the question to the reader.

